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REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS OPERATION IN MOZAMBIQUE (ONUMOZ)

INTRODUCTION

1. In my report of 9 October 1992 (S/24624), I conveyed to the Security Council the principal features of the general peace agreement for Mozambique, which is contained in document S/24635, and brought to its attention the role proposed for the United Nations in relation to the peace process. I recommended an immediate plan of action. On 13 October 1992, the Security Council adopted resolution 782 (1992), by which it welcomed the signature of a general peace agreement between the Government of the Republic of Mozambique and the Résistência Nacional Moçambicana (RENAMO), approved the appointment by the Secretary-General of an interim Special Representative and the dispatch to Mozambique of a team of up to 25 military observers, and requested the Secretary-General to report on the establishment of a United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ), including in particular a detailed estimate of the cost of that operation.

I. THE CURRENT STATUS OF THE PEACE PROCESS

2. In pursuance of that resolution, I took action the same day to appoint Mr. Aldo Ajello, a national of Italy and a staff member of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), as my interim Special Representative for Mozambique, and asked him to proceed to Maputo to assist the parties in setting up the joint machinery, which was to be chaired by the United Nations, in finalizing the modalities and conditions for the military arrangements and in carrying out the various other actions that were required of them at the very beginning of the process. I also entrusted him with the functions described in paragraphs 14 and 15 of my report of 9 October 1992 to the Security Council (S/24642). At the same time, I made arrangements to send to Mozambique a military team whose personnel had been drawn from existing peace-keeping missions and whose limited tasks were described in paragraph 16 of the above-mentioned report.

3. The interim Special Representative and the team of 21 military observers arrived in Mozambique on 15 October 1992, the day when the general peace agreement (hereinafter referred to as "the agreement") came into force, following publication in the Official Gazette of the legal instruments adopted by the Assembly of the Republic of Mozambique. On 20 October 1992, two teams of military observers were also deployed to Nampula and Beira.

4. Since his arrival, the interim Special Representative has met on several occasions with the President of Mozambique, Mr. Chissano, as well as with Mr. Dhlakama, President of RENAMO, and has had extensive exchanges with both leaders on various matters related to the early start of implementation of the agreement. He has also met with members of the Mozambican Government and representatives of RENAMO, representatives of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), and the ambassadors of the mediator State (Italy) and of the observer States at the Rome talks (France, Portugal, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America), as well as with other members of the diplomatic community in Maputo. He has, in addition, discussed aspects relating to the implementation of the agreement with representatives of United Nations agencies and programmes and major non-governmental organizations that are currently involved in humanitarian relief effort in Mozambique and that are called upon to assist in carrying out related aspects of the agreement.

5. I am pleased to report that both the Government of Mozambique and the leadership of RENAMO, as well as representatives of the diplomatic community in Mozambique, have expressed their appreciation for the prompt action taken by the Security Council and the Secretary-General.

6. Both parties have committed themselves to undertake immediately after, and in some instances before, the entry into effect of the agreement, specific action to set in motion the joint mechanisms to monitor and verify its implementation. However, no such action had been initiated at the time when the interim Special Representative arrived in Mozambique. Nor had the parties been in direct contact since the signature of the agreement, and RENAMO had no official delegation in the capital. The RENAMO delegation did not wish to move from its headquarters in Gorongosa to Maputo until the Government had provided adequate logistic support, i.e. appropriate housing, transport and communication facilities as foreseen in the agreement. This logistic problem, seemingly marginal, turned out to be a major impediment to the early establishment of the monitoring and verification machinery. Meanwhile, major violations of the cease-fire were reported in various areas of the country, and the parties presented official complaints to the interim Special Representative. A large military operation was reportedly undertaken by RENAMO, which occupied one major town, Angoche, and the villages of Maganja da Costa, Memba and Lugela.

7. In the absence of the machinery foreseen in the agreement for the verification of alleged violations, the interim Special Representative has not been in a position to investigate these incidents. He offered to send United Nations military observers into the areas where military operations had taken place, but this was not possible for lack of agreement between the two

parties. I brought these matters to the attention of the Security Council in my letter of 23 October 1992 to its President. The President, in a statement dated 27 October 1992 (S/24719), expressed the Council's deep concern about the reports of major violations of the cease-fire, called upon the parties to halt such violations immediately and urged them to cooperate fully with the interim Special Representative.

8. In order to avoid the escalation of violations, the interim Special Representative called for an informal meeting of the two parties. In a personal letter, he urged Mr. Dhlakama to attend such a meeting, the unsolved logistics problems notwithstanding. He also made a public appeal to both parties. The initiative was successful, and both the Government and RENAMO sent high-level delegations to attend their first meeting in Maputo.

9. Thereafter, the two delegations met on numerous occasions, both bilaterally and together with the interim Special Representative. All conditions and modalities for the establishment of the Commissions foreseen under the agreement were reviewed. The composition of each Commission was extensively discussed and agreement was finally reached. On 4 November 1992, one month after the signature of the agreement, the interim Special Representative was able to appoint the Supervisory and Monitoring Commission, which held its first meeting the same day and appointed the three main subsidiary commissions, the Cease-fire Commission, the Reintegration Commission and the Joint Commission for the Formation of the Mozambican Defence Forces.

10. The Supervisory and Monitoring Commission is composed of government and RENAMO delegations, with representatives of France, Italy, Portugal, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America and the Organization of African Unity. This Commission is chaired by the United Nations. The Cease-fire Commission is composed of government and RENAMO delegations, with representatives of Botswana, Egypt, France, Italy, Nigeria, Portugal, the United Kingdom and the United States, and is also chaired by the United Nations. The Cease-fire Commission will have subordinate subcommissions in three regional headquarters and also monitoring groups at the assembly areas. The Reintegration Commission is composed of government and RENAMO delegations, with representatives of Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the United States and the European Community (EC) and is chaired by the United Nations. The Joint Commission for the Formation of the Mozambican Defence Forces is composed of government and RENAMO delegations, with representatives of France, Portugal and the United Kingdom. The United Nations has not been requested to take part in this commission.

11. The Supervisory and Monitoring Commission will guarantee the implementation of the agreement, assume responsibility for authentic interpretation of it, settle any disputes that may arise between the parties and guide and coordinate the activities of the other Commissions. The Cease-fire Commission is responsible for supervising the cease-fire and demobilization. The Reintegration Commission is responsible for the economic

and social reintegration of demobilized military personnel. The Joint Commission for the Formation of the Mozambican Defence Forces is responsible for supervising the formation of the new unified armed forces.

12. All Commissions and their subordinate bodies have been established and have begun their work. However, they will require some technical support, including an impartial secretariat, which could best be provided by ONUMOZ. Legal services will also be necessary in order to ensure that the working procedures of the commissions meet international standards and to resolve possible legal disputes. As the composition of the main commissions is multinational and all decisions need to be recorded, translation, secretarial and information services will be required. As for the regional offices of the Cease-fire Commission, transport facilities will be necessary to enable the commissions to carry out their duties on the spot.

13. Meanwhile, the Government has undertaken military operations to retake the four places seized by RENAMO in mid-October (see para. 6 above). The interim Special Representative has continued to urge the two parties to refrain from any type of military operation and to discuss and settle all disputes in the appropriate commissions.

II. BASIC ASSUMPTIONS FOR THE UNITED NATIONS OPERATION IN MOZAMBIQUE

14. In formulating my recommendations to the Security Council on the establishment of a United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ), I have been guided by three fundamental considerations. The first relates to the trust placed in the United Nations by both parties, as well as by the people of Mozambique. The agreement envisages that the United Nations will provide an impartial and supportive structure to help both parties to break the vicious cycle of violence that has caused so much suffering to Mozambique over the years.

15. The second consideration derives from the breadth of the responsibilities entrusted to the United Nations under the agreement. These will require the involvement of the entire international community, especially United Nations programmes and specialized agencies, and also bilateral entities, intergovernmental agencies and non-governmental organizations, all of which can contribute to the rebuilding and development of a peaceful Mozambique.

16. The third consideration relates to the geography of Mozambique and the country's current condition after 14 years of civil war. It covers an area of 800,000 square kilometres. It is elongated in shape, extending about 1,800 km from north to south, 600 km from east to west in the north and 300 km in the south. Its communications have been devastated by the war. It has been afflicted by the worst drought in decades and food is in short supply. There is an abundance of arms and many armed bandits operate outside the control of the armed forces of either side. Several million Mozambicans are internally displaced or are refugees in neighbouring countries.

17. All these factors have to be taken into account in assessing the human and material resources that ONUMOZ will require. An additional factor is the existence of four transport corridors (the Beira, Limpopo, Nacala and Tete corridors, each providing road, rail and/or pipeline links), which run across Mozambique from the Indian Ocean to land-locked countries to the north and west. These corridors are of critical importance to Mozambique itself, to United Nations humanitarian and other operations in southern Africa and to neighbouring countries. As the civil war intensified, Malawi and Zimbabwe, with the Government of Mozambique's agreement, deployed troops in some of the corridors to assist the Government's forces in keeping them open. With the implementation of the agreement's provisions on the assembly and demobilization of the two sides' forces and on the withdrawal of foreign forces, ONUMOZ will have to assume transitional responsibility for the security of the corridors in order to avoid any vacuum that could be exploited by bandits, pending the formation of the new unified armed forces.

III. OVERALL FRAMEWORK FOR THE OPERATION

18. In accordance with the agreement, the mandate of ONUMOZ would, if the Security Council agrees, be as follows:

(a) Political: to facilitate impartially the implementation of the agreement, in particular by chairing the Supervisory and Monitoring Commission and its subordinate commissions;

(b) Military:

(i) To monitor and verify the cease-fire, the separation and concentration of forces, their demobilization and the collection, storage and destruction of weapons;

(ii) To monitor and verify the complete withdrawal of foreign forces;

(iii) To monitor and verify the disbanding of private and irregular armed groups;

(iv) To authorize security arrangements for vital infrastructures; and

(v) To provide security for United Nations and other international activities in support of the peace process, especially in the corridors;

(c) Electoral: to provide technical assistance and monitor the entire electoral process;

(d) Humanitarian: to coordinate and monitor all humanitarian assistance operations, in particular those relating to refugees, internally displaced persons, demobilized military personnel and the affected local population, and, in this context, to chair the Humanitarian Assistance Committee.

19. The operational concept of ONUMOZ is based on the strong interrelationship between the four components of its mandate. Without sufficient humanitarian aid, and especially food supplies, the security situation in the country may deteriorate and the demobilization process might stall. Without adequate military protection, the humanitarian aid would not reach its destination. Without sufficient progress in the political area, the confidence required for the disarmament and rehabilitation process would not exist. The electoral process, in turn, requires prompt demobilization and formation of the new armed forces, without which the conditions would not exist for successful elections.

20. These strong linkages require a fully integrated approach and strong coordination by the interim Special Representative. The following description of the activities proposed for ONUMOZ in each of its four areas of responsibility should, therefore, be seen as an indivisible and interdependent operational plan.

IV. OPERATIONAL PLAN FOR UNITED NATIONS OBSERVATION OF MILITARY ASPECTS OF THE AGREEMENT

21. The arrangements for the cease-fire and other military aspects of the peace process are set out in detail in protocol IV to the agreement and were highlighted in my report to the Council of 9 October 1992 (S/24642). This role is similar to that entrusted to the United Nations in other recent cases where the Organization has monitored the implementation of a cease-fire, the separation and concentration of forces, their demobilization and the collection and storage of weapons. In addition, the Cease-fire Commission would also approve plans for dealing with other armed groups, including irregulars, and would authorize security arrangements for vital infrastructure, including the corridors.

22. To ensure credible verification, it would be necessary to obtain from the parties lists of all troops and paramilitary forces, assembled or unassembled, together with details of weapons and ammunition held by them. There would have to be an agreement on the categories of troops that would be temporarily exempted from the requirement to assemble. Their numbers should be strictly limited and regularly verified. The demobilization process would be initiated and vigorously pursued as soon as troops started to assemble. Arrangements would also be needed for ONUMOZ to control weapons and ammunition in possession of the Government and RENAMO. All arms and ammunition not required for the new armed forces would be destroyed under close supervision of the United Nations. A systematic programme for removal of weapons from the civilian population would also be required from the outset.

23. ONUMOZ's verification function would be carried out mainly by teams of United Nations military observers at the 49 assembly areas in 3 military regions and elsewhere in the field. They would work with, but would remain separate from, the monitoring groups composed of representatives of the two parties at each location. They would observe the manner in which those groups

were carrying out their functions in order to verify that the joint monitoring machinery was working effectively. They would respond to requests for assistance and would use their good offices to resolve any problems that might arise within the monitoring groups, conducting their own investigations and patrolling the whole extent of their assembly areas. Teams would also be deployed at airports, ports and other critical areas, including RENAMO headquarters. The security of United Nations personnel would primarily be the responsibility of the parties that controlled the zone where they were present, although in some cases the military observers would be collocated with armed United Nations troops.

24. The military aspects of the United Nations operation in Mozambique would be inescapably linked with the humanitarian effort. The approximately 110,000 soldiers who come to the assembly areas will be disarmed, demobilized and reintegrated into civil society. They will need food and other support as soon as the assembly areas are established, and there should be special provision in the ONUMOZ budget to cover these costs. The refugees and displaced persons who will inevitably gather around the assembly areas will also require food assistance, which will be provided as part of the humanitarian programme. The relief programmes for assembled soldiers and civil populations in the vicinity will need to be closely coordinated, and it will be desirable to avoid population movements towards the assembly areas. Improved accessibility, the demining of roads and the organization of secure transport will be important in this context.

25. An ONUMOZ technical unit, staffed by civilian personnel, will assist the interim Special Representative in the implementation of the demobilization programme and will collaborate closely with UNOHAC (see para. 42 below) on its humanitarian aspects. These will include:

(a) The distribution of food, medicine, health care and other essential services to the assembly areas;

(b) The organization of a database, as well as the issue of personal documents for the demobilized;

(c) The supply of civilian clothing and the organization of transport for the ex-combatants when they leave the assembly areas for their homes;

(d) The establishment of a solid link with the provincial and district authorities responsible for the civilian dimension of the demobilization process.

26. The agreement provides for the withdrawal of foreign troops to be initiated following the entry into force of the cease-fire. Simultaneously, the Supervisory and Monitoring Commission, through the Cease-fire Commission, would assume immediate responsibility "for verifying and ensuring security of strategic and trading routes", of which the most important are the corridors described in paragraph 17 above. The withdrawal of foreign troops started after the agreement's entry into force, and two teams of United Nations

military observers have been deployed to monitor it. The withdrawal of the remaining foreign troops before alternative security arrangements were in place would leave the corridors at the mercy of roaming groups of heavily armed irregulars. My interim Special Representative has explored several options, but for political and legal reasons, including the clear provisions of the agreement, it would be extremely difficult to extend the presence of the Malawian and Zimbabwean troops.

27. I have given this question much thought. There is an imperative need to continue to ensure the security of the corridors and other key routes and to protect humanitarian convoys using them. There seems to be no alternative but for ONUMOZ to assume this responsibility. For this function it will be necessary to deploy five logistically self-sufficient infantry battalions. In addition, three logistically self-sufficient engineer companies will be needed, supported, as necessary, by mine-clearing and engineering contractors in order to assist in demining and road repair and in the destruction of arms and ammunition not required for the new armed forces. These units must be deployed as rapidly as possible in order to permit early completion of the withdrawal of foreign forces.

28. The following additional elements would be part of ONUMOZ's military component and would provide support to the other components of the mission:

(a) A Headquarters company, including a military police platoon;

(b) A military communications unit to ensure secure communications within the entire mission area for all components of ONUMOZ;

(c) A substantial aviation unit to provide a high degree of air mobility in a devastated country where many of the roads have been made impassable. The aviation unit would be responsible for command and liaison, reconnaissance, investigations, medical evacuation and resupply. It would probably be obtained from commercial sources and would consist of up to 24 rotary and fixed-wing aircraft (utility helicopters, light passenger aircraft, medium passenger/cargo aircraft); additional heavy cargo capacity would be obtained, if needed, on a local charter basis;

(d) A military medical unit to support all ONUMOZ components, including a field hospital and medical evacuation capability. The infantry battalions would include integral medical support;

(e) Three logistic companies, as the conditions in Mozambique make it impossible to rely on a civilian resupply system. Each company would consist of a transport platoon, a supply platoon, a fuel, oil and lubricant platoon and a workshop platoon. One would be located at each of the three regional headquarters;

(f) A movement control company.

V. POSSIBLE MONITORING OF THE POLICE

29. While the agreement does not provide a specific role for United Nations civilian police in monitoring the neutrality of the Mozambican police, experience elsewhere suggests that this could be desirable in order to inspire confidence that violations of civil liberties, human rights and political freedom will be avoided. Throughout the peace process, but particularly during the electoral campaign, the presence of a United Nations police component could be most useful, although agreement on this point was not reached in the Rome negotiations. If agreed by the two sides, such a component could be headed by an Inspector General, and consist of up to 128 police officers, deployed in the regions and provincial capitals. It would work in close cooperation with the National Police Affairs Commission and provide technical advice to this body as required. I believe that such a unit would be a valuable addition to ONUMOZ and I therefore intend to ask my interim Special Representative to reopen this matter with the parties and seek their concurrence.

VI. MONITORING OF THE ELECTORAL PROCESS AND THE PROVISION OF TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE FOR THE ELECTIONS

30. Under the terms of the agreement, legislative and presidential elections will be held simultaneously one year after the date of signature of the agreement. This period may be extended if it is determined that circumstances exist that preclude its observance. In the light of recent experience in Angola, I believe it to be of critical importance that the elections should not take place until the military aspects of the agreement have been fully implemented. It is also important that the peace process should not be drawn out indefinitely. I have therefore asked the interim Special Representative to give the highest priority to timely implementation of the cease-fire, the assembly, disarmament and demobilization of troops, and the formation of the new armed forces.

31. In the agreement, the parties agreed to invite the United Nations and other organizations and private individuals to observe the elections from the start of the electoral campaign until the new Government's assumption of office. They also agreed to seek technical and material assistance from the United Nations. On the day the agreement was signed, President Chissano formally addressed appropriate requests to me on these matters (S/24635).

32. The terms of reference of ONUMOZ's electoral component would be as follows:

(a) To verify the impartiality of the National Elections Commission and its organs in all aspects and stages of the electoral process;

(b) To verify that political parties and alliances enjoy complete freedom of organization, movement, assembly and expression, without hindrance and intimidation;

(c) To verify that all political parties and alliances have fair access to State mass media and that there is fairness in the allocation of both the hour and duration of radio and television broadcasts;

(d) To verify that the electoral rolls are properly drawn up and that qualified voters are not denied identification and registration cards or the right to vote;

(e) To report to the electoral authorities on complaints, irregularities and interferences reported or observed, and, if necessary, to request the electoral authorities to take action to resolve and rectify them, as well as conducting its own independent investigation of irregularities;

(f) To observe all activities related to the registration of voters, the organization of the poll, the electoral campaign, the poll itself and the counting, computation and announcement of the results;

(g) To participate in the electoral education campaign;

(h) To prepare periodic reports on the evolution of the electoral process, that will be submitted to the Secretary-General through his interim Special Representative.

33. The electoral component would prepare independent reports about the conduct of the elections. It would establish a special relationship with the National Elections Commission.

34. In carrying out its mandate to verify the impartiality of the National Elections Commission and its organs, the electoral component would evaluate the criteria for the appointment of electoral authorities at the regional and provincial levels. The fairness of challenged actions or significant decisions at both the national and the provincial levels would be similarly evaluated.

35. In order to verify that political parties and alliances enjoy complete freedom of organization, movement, assembly and expression without hindrance and intimidation, the electoral component would establish offices in each provincial capital, with an adequate number of observer teams at each of them. The latter would establish contact with political parties and social organizations at the national and local levels and would visit villages and municipalities throughout the country. They would attend all important political rallies and other relevant activities, and verify the observance by all parties of the electoral law and any code of conduct that might be agreed between the parties or established by the electoral authorities. This activity would be reinforced by a public information campaign about electoral activities, ONUMOZ's objectives and the mechanisms established.

36. To verify that all political parties and alliances have fair access to State mass media, the electoral component would verify the distribution of broadcasting time between parties, the content of news broadcasts and the

fairness of tariffs. It would also evaluate complaints received on the use of other public resources for political purposes.

37. In carrying out its mandate to verify that the electoral rolls were properly drawn up, the teams would periodically visit registration centres and evaluate complaints received or irregularities observed. The electoral component would accordingly have to be deployed before the beginning of registration.

38. In order to follow up complaints, irregularities and interferences reported or observed, provincial offices would receive complaints and requests presented by political parties or relevant social organizations, analyse their relevance, compile the information on the issues in question and transmit them to the electoral authorities and/or appropriate parties. Significant threats to the fairness of the elections would be carefully investigated and, if necessary, independently reported. A data bank would record the complaints received and analyses of trends would be produced periodically.

39. ONUMOZ would need to include an Electoral Division headed by a Director, with a total of up to 148 international electoral officers (including two consultants), supported by an appropriate number of United Nations volunteers and international and local support staff. It should have the following structure:

(a) The Office of the Director (Maputo): a unit that would provide overall direction to the Electoral Division. It would maintain contacts with the Government of Mozambique, RENAMO and the National Elections Commission and the main political parties;

(b) Three Regional Offices, each headed by a Regional Coordinator in the southern, central and northern regions;

(c) Provincial Offices each headed by a provincial coordinator assisted by a team of up to 10 Electoral Officers.

40. During the polling itself, the Electoral Division would require the services of up to 1,200 international observers. I have asked the interim Special Representative to seek the cooperation of regional organizations, governments and non-governmental organizations who intend to send election observers to Mozambique, in order to minimize the number of additional observers who will have to be deployed by the United Nations. It should also be possible to draw on United Nations and other international personnel who will already be in Mozambique for non-electoral purposes. All observers would have to have full access to all stages of the poll. With their help, the Electoral Division would develop a projection of results for internal purposes.

41. When a country for the first time prepares for multiparty elections, it is crucial that its electoral authorities have adequate access to technical assistance and material support. The planning and execution of voter registration and polling presents a formidable challenge to national electoral

authorities. In Mozambique adequate legal advice, logistical planning and support would be as important as political commitment of the two parties to ensure free and fair elections. A major national as well as international effort would be required. This would encompass a broad range of needs: vehicles, aircraft, communications, voting booths and material, food, tents, salary for registration and electoral brigades. Legal advice on the drafting of an electoral law and technical guidance on the conduct of elections would be especially essential. Technical assistance, if timely, would help to create an orderly and coherent process. In anticipation of the request from the Government referred to in paragraph 31 above, a United Nations technical mission on electoral matters visited Mozambique in September 1992 and established contacts with the Government. It is envisaged that United Nations consultants will continue to cooperate closely with the national electoral authorities.

42. Specific activities of the United Nations in this area will largely occur outside the immediate mandate of ONUMOZ, albeit in close coordination with its electoral component. It is my intention to provide technical assistance to the electoral authorities through the United Nations Development Programme and other existing mechanisms of the United Nations system. These United Nations activities will have to be coordinated closely by my interim Special Representative with those of other intergovernmental bodies, in particular OAU and the European Community, and with bilateral donors. Some of the donors have already sent preparatory teams to the country with a view to elaborating a comprehensive document on electoral support which would be presented to the forthcoming pledging conference in Rome. The United Nations would be ready to play the main coordinating role for the provision of technical assistance to the whole electoral process in Mozambique.

VII. PLAN FOR THE UNITED NATIONS COORDINATION OF THE HUMANITARIAN ASPECTS OF THE AGREEMENT

43. The character and scope of the United Nations ongoing humanitarian assistance programmes in Mozambique require adjustment following the signing of the agreement, in which the parties undertook to facilitate significantly the provision of humanitarian aid to previously inaccessible areas and called on the United Nations to coordinate the provision of all such assistance. Immediately after the signing of the agreement, I accordingly dispatched a humanitarian assistance mission to Mozambique to assess existing United Nations operations in this area and to devise a more effective United Nations response to the intended expansion of humanitarian activities, with emphasis on the development of an appropriate coordination mechanism.

44. As a result, it is my recommendation that ONUMOZ should have a humanitarian component in the form of a United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance, which would be established in Maputo, with suboffices at the regional and provincial levels. It would replace the present office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Emergency Relief Operations. Headed by the Humanitarian Affairs Coordinator, and under the

overall authority of my interim Special Representative, it would function as an integrated component of ONUMOZ. To ensure the proper provision and delivery of relief assistance to an expanded beneficiary population in Mozambique, UNOHAC would coordinate the various humanitarian assistance programmes. Operational agencies and the non-governmental aid community would be asked to provide representatives to work within the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance.

45. It is estimated that, as a result of both the war and the continuing drought, the internally displaced population in Mozambique totals some 3 to 4 million people. At present, about 3 million Mozambicans living in accessible areas are receiving humanitarian assistance. The signing of the agreement has already created access to additional affected areas, many of which are controlled by RENAMO. As a consequence, nearly 270,000 additional beneficiaries are being provided with humanitarian assistance by the United Nations and by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), under the terms of the Declaration of Rome on the Principles of Humanitarian Assistance of 15 July 1992. Indications are that the number of additional beneficiaries may reach 500,000 in a matter of months.

46. While 1.4 million of the estimated 1.8 million Mozambican refugees living in neighbouring countries receive assistance, the drought is reported to have caused many other Mozambicans to seek refuge there during the past three months. The expected returnee population can thus be estimated at not less than 1.8 million.

47. The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance will also make available food and other relief for distribution to the soldiers in the assembly areas by a technical unit of ONUMOZ, as described in section IV above. Subsequently, humanitarian aid would be required for the reintegration of demobilized troops into their communities.

VIII. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF ONUMOZ

48. The organizational structure of ONUMOZ would be as follows:

(a) Mission headquarters and the Office of the interim Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Maputo. The Office will consist of an Executive Director, a Special Assistant, a Political Adviser, an Information Officer, a Planning and Analysis Officer, a Legal Adviser and both international and locally recruited support staff;

(b) A Military Component with headquarters in Maputo, which would include a Military Observer group, five infantry battalions, one engineer battalion, three logistic companies, a Headquarters company, a movement control company, a communications unit, a medical unit and an air unit (probably from commercial sources). The military component would be headed by a Force Commander with the rank of Major General. There would be three regional offices, as set out in section IV above;

(c) If the parties agree, a police component in Maputo, headed by a Chief Police Observer, who would hold the rank of Chief Superintendent or its equivalent, with three regional offices and staff outposted in provincial towns, as set out in section V above;

(d) An electoral component in Maputo, with three regional offices and provincial offices, as set out in section VI above;

(e) An Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance in Maputo, with 3 regional offices and 10 provincial offices, as set out in section VII above;

(f) An administrative component in Maputo, with three regional offices, providing support in the areas of finance, personnel, procurement, communication, travel, compensation, building management, property control, translation and interpretation, electronic data processing and security.

IX. OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

49. It is a matter of great satisfaction that an end is at last in sight to the cruel war that has ravaged Mozambique for 14 years. Both the Government and RENAMO deserve to be commended for their statesmanship and diplomatic skill and, above all, for their commitment to their people and their country. I very much hope that in the months ahead they will be guided in their actions by the same spirit of national reconciliation and unity. As the people of Mozambique prepare for democratic multiparty elections, they are starting out on a road that can be either divisive or constructive. It is my fervent hope that the spirit of national unity will also shape the electoral process, and that this will be an opportunity for the people of Mozambique to choose freely the leaders who will jointly work for a better future.

50. The mediators and the observers who have so patiently helped to bring about the agreement also deserve the highest praise. I trust that I can count on their continued political and material support as the peace process evolves.

51. The task which the Government and RENAMO have agreed to ask the United Nations to assume is a large and difficult one. The difficulties derive from the size of the country, the devastated state of its infrastructure, the disruption of its economy by war and drought, the limited capacity of the Government to cope with the new tasks arising from the general peace agreement and the complexity of the processes enshrined in the agreement. An additional dimension derives from the critical importance of the Mozambican corridors for so much of southern Africa. To achieve in one year (of which a month and a half have already passed) the assembly, disarmament and demobilization of the two sides' troops, the formation of new armed forces, the resettlement of 5 to 6 million refugees and displaced persons, the provision of humanitarian relief to all parts of the country and the organization and conduct of elections will require a huge and cooperative effort by the Government and RENAMO and by the international community, with the United Nations in the lead.

52. As will be evident from the present report, I feel obliged to recommend that very substantial resources should be made available for this purpose, especially on the military side. This reflects my conviction that it will not be possible in Mozambique to create the conditions for a successful election unless the military situation has been brought fully under control. If the United Nations is to undertake the responsibilities entrusted to it by the Mozambicans, what has to be done must be done well, and quickly. But however great the resources the United Nations decides to devote to Mozambique, the general peace agreement will not be implemented unless the Mozambican parties make a determined effort in good faith to honour their commitments. The efforts of the United Nations can only be in support of theirs. In the light of recent experiences elsewhere, the recommendations in the present report may be thought to invite the international community to take a risk. I believe that the risk is worth taking; but I cannot disguise that it exists.

53. On this basis, I recommend to the Security Council that it approve the establishment and deployment of ONUMOZ as set out in the present report, and in particular that it agree to:

(a) The establishment of an Office of the interim Special Representative for Mozambique, with up to 12 international Professional staff, 8 international support staff and an adequate number of locally recruited staff;

(b) The deployment of a military component consisting of a Headquarters company and military police platoon; 354 military observers; 5 logistically self-sufficient infantry battalions, each composed of up to 850 personnel; 1 engineer battalion, with contracted assistance as needed; 3 logistic companies; and air, communications, medical and movement control support units;

(c) The deployment of a civilian technical unit to support the logistic tasks relating to the demobilization programme in the assembly areas, with adequate resources;

(d) The deployment, subject to the concurrence of the parties, of 128 police officers to monitor civil liberties and to provide technical advice to the National Police Affairs Commission;

(e) The deployment of an Electoral Division consisting of up to 148 international electoral officers and support staff, from the start of the electoral component of the peace process, followed by the deployment of up to 1,200 international observers for the elections themselves and the periods immediately preceding and following them;

(f) The deployment of 16 international Professional staff to enable the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance to coordinate and monitor all humanitarian assistance within the regions and provinces of Mozambique;

(g) The deployment of up to 28 international Professional staff, up to 100 United Nations Volunteers, up to 124 international support staff and an adequate number of local staff, to provide secretariat functions and administrative support to the military, police (if confirmed), electoral and humanitarian components of ONUMOZ, as well as to the commissions chaired by the United Nations.

54. Preliminary cost estimates for ONUMOZ are contained in an addendum to the present report which is being circulated separately.